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Promoting International Cybersecurity Cooperation: 




 & Matthew C. Waxman
** 
 
Cybersecurity threats have become ubiquitous. Today, cyber-attacks by 
state and non-state actors—including disruption of infrastructure, large-scale theft 
of data and intellectual property, hacking of political actors and election systems--
are generating significant losses.  These losses, moreover, are occurring across a 
range of metrics, including national security, privacy, and economics.   
Global efforts by states to cooperate through international rules in 
combatting these threats have generated mixed results, at best.  For example, in 
2013, a United Nations Group of Governmental Experts (the UN GGE), including 
experts from the Chinese, Russian and U.S. governments, adopted a consensus 
report indicating that “international law, and in particular the Charter of the 
United Nations, is applicable and is essential to maintaining peace and stability 
and promoting an open, secure, peaceful and accessible ICT [information and 
communication technology] environment.”1 This view was confirmed by another 
UN GGE in 2015, which also endorsed a series of voluntary (i.e., non-legally 
binding) norms for responsible state behavior.  These included prohibiting states 
from peacetime targeting of critical infrastructure and the work of computer 
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1
 See Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and 
Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, ¶19, UN Doc. A/68/98 (June 24, 
2013) [“2013 GGE Report”].   
 The GGE process is, of course, not the only vehicle for inter-state cooperation on 
cybersecurity.  In 2015, for example, President Barack Obama and President Xi Jinping 
announced a “common understanding” on cyberespionage. They agreed that neither the U.S. nor 
the Chinese government “will conduct or knowingly support cyber-enabled theft of intellectual 
property, including trade secrets or other confidential business information, with the intent of 
providing commercial advantages to companies or commercial sectors.” See Office of Press Sec’y, 
Fact Sheet: President Xi Jinping’s State Visit to the United States (Sept. 25, 2015).  This principle 
was later endorsed by the G-20.  See G-20 Leaders’ Communiqué, Antalya Summit, Nov. 15-16, 
2015, ¶26 at http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000111117.pdf. The prohibition on cyber-espionage was 
also recently reaffirmed by the Trump Administration and the Xi Government.  Cory Bennett, 
Why Trump is Sticking with Obama’s China Hacking Deal, POLITICO, Nov. 8, 2017.  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3082907 
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security incident response teams (CSIRTS).
2
  Unfortunately, much of the GGE’s 
momentum was lost in 2017 when the latest GGE failed to generate any report.  
According to the U.S. expert at the negotiations, “[d]espite years of discussion 
and study, some participants . . . seem to want to walk back progress made in 
previous GGE reports. I am coming to the unfortunate conclusion that those who 
are unwilling to affirm the applicability of these international legal rules and 
principles believe their States are free to act in or through cyberspace to achieve 
their political ends with no limits or constraints on their actions.”3 
With the recent GGE’s failure, attention has shifted to other fora for 
cultivating international cybersecurity rules. Some efforts—like the non-
governmental Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace—are focused on 
reaching new universal agreements on substantive standards for state behavior. 
4
   
Meanwhile, Microsoft President and Chief Legal Officer Brad Smith has been 
promoting a “Digital Geneva Convention,” which notably includes a call for 
global technology companies to agree to a set of rules on cybersecurity.
5
 
But cooperation in cybersecurity need not always involve devising new 
norms, rules, interpretations or principles any more than it must involve all 
states.
6
 Progress can come through the development of new processes among like-
minded groups of states and other stakeholders that seek to effectuate existing 
international laws and other norms.    
In this vein, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is often cited as a 
possible model for future cybersecurity cooperation.  Some have already analyzed 
whether the PSI’s approach to the interdiction of weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD) could apply to cybersecurity.
7
  In this paper, we offer a different analysis, 
examining the architecture of PSI’s cooperative mechanisms (rather than its 
contents) as a possible model for future cybersecurity cooperation among 
interested states.  We conclude that there are worth-while parallels to draw upon, 
                                                          
2
 See Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and 
Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, ¶13(h), (k), U.N. Doc. A/70/174 
(July 22, 2015) [“2015 GGE Report”]. 
3
 Michele Markoff, U.S. Expert to the GGE, Explanation of Position at the Conclusion of the 
2016-2017 UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Developments in the Field of 
Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, June 23, 2017, 
available at https://usun.state.gov/remarks/7880. 
4
 Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace (GCSC), Global Commission Proposes Call 
to Protect the Public Core of the Internet, Nov. 21, 2017, at https://cyberstability.org/news/global-
commission-proposes-action-to-increase-cyberspace-stability/.  For details on the composition and 
mission of the GCSC, see https://cyberstability.org/.  
5
 Brad Smith, The Need for a Digital Geneva Convention, Feb. 14, 2017, 
https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2017/02/14/need-digital-geneva-convention/.  In the 
interest of full disclosure, one of us—Duncan Hollis—is presently advising Microsoft on 
international legal issues relating to its proposal.   
6
 See, e.g., Martha Finnemore and Duncan B. Hollis, Constructing Norms for Global 
Cybersecurity, 110 AM. J. INT’L L. 425, 427, 465 (2016). 
7
 See, e.g., Trey Herr, Governing Proliferation in Cybersecurity, GLOBAL SUMMITRY (July 2017), 
also available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2958978.  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3082907 
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which could allow interested states to further cooperate in addressing current 
cyberthreats.   
I. The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)  
In December 2002, a North Korean freighter, the So San was transiting the 
Arabian Sea without flying a flag and with a newly painted hull that obscured its 
name and home port.  U.S. intelligence officials asked Spanish marines to board 
and search the ship as a “stateless” vessel.8  On board, they discovered 15 Scud 
missiles hidden under bags of cement.  Efforts to seize these missiles, however, 
were unavailing.  The Yemeni government informed U.S. and Spanish authorities 
that they had purchased the missiles, and, in the absence of international law rules 
against transporting such materials, those authorities allowed the delivery to 
proceed.
9
  The event was seen as evidence of both (i) how seriously many States 
take the international law principle that “vessels on the high seas are subject to no 
authority except that of the State whose flag they fly”10; and (ii) serious gaps in 
States’ collective capability to deal with the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, their delivery systems, and related goods.
11
   
Within a year, the United States and Spain were among eleven founding 
members of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a joint effort to strengthen 
the “political commitment, practical capacities, and legal authorities necessary to 
stop, search, and, if necessary, seize vessels and aircraft believed to be 
transporting ‘weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related 
materials’.”12 PSI was not, however, a typical treaty-based international 
institution.  Rather, it came into existence by virtue of States endorsing a political 
commitment, the Statement of Interdiction Principles (SIP).
13
   
                                                          
8
 See U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (Dec. 10, 1982), 1833 UNTS 397, Art. 110 
(authorizing a warship to board a foreign ship that appears to be without nationality).  When 
Spanish authorities tried to board the So San, its master claimed the vessel was Cambodian, 
leading to a request to Cambodia that Spanish forces could board the vessel – permission which 
Cambodia granted.  See Dep’t of State Briefing, Proliferation Security Initiative, FED. NEWS 
SERVICE, Sept. 9, 2003.    
9
 See Joel A. Doolin, The Proliferation Security Initiative: Cornerstone of a New International 
Norm, 59 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REV. 29 (2005); Michael Byers, Policing the High Seas: The 
Proliferation Security Initiative, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 527 (2004); Thom Shanker, Threats and 
Responses: Arms Smuggling; Scud Missiles Found on Ship of North Korea, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 
2002.   
10
 S.S. Lotus Case (Fr. V. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9, at 25 (Sept. 7).  
11
 Byers, supra note 8, at 527. 
12
 Id. Before the SIP, the PSI idea was first announced in a Presidential press conference in 
Poland. President George W. Bush, Remarks at Wawel Royal Castle in Krakow, Poland, at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/20030531-3.html (May 31, 2003).  
13
 Aaron Dunne, The Proliferation Security Initiative: Legal and Operational Realities, SIPRI 
Policy Paper, No. 36 (May 2013). 
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A short document, the SIP identifies the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) as a common threat and pledges endorsing States to four sets 
of activities: 
1) To “undertake effective measure” to interdict “the transfer or transport of 
WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and 
non-state actors of proliferation concern”.14 
2) To streamline procedures for rapid exchange of “relevant information 
concerning suspected proliferation activities”, including protecting the 
confidentiality of information shared, and dedicating “appropriate 
resources and efforts to interdiction operations and capabilities.”15 
3) To strengthen “relevant national legal authorities” and “relevant 
international law frameworks” to accomplish the PSI’s objectives;16 and 
4) To prevent the transport of covered materials where there is a reasonable 
suspicion that a vessel or aircraft is carrying them, including boarding and 
searching vessels flying the endorsing State’s flag (or consenting to other 
States doing so); requiring aircraft to land for inspection; inspecting 
vessels at transshipment points within its jurisdiction; and seizing covered 
goods.
17
   
The SPI directs that all PSI activities should occur only to the extent consistent 




Other states were invited to join PSI, and as of today 105 States have 
endorsed the SIP.
19
  Participation is subdivided between a core group of 21 States 
comprising the “Operational Experts Group” who have the greatest capacity to 
                                                          
14
 Fact Sheet, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement of Interdiction 
Principles, Sept. 4, 2003, Principle 1 (defining “states or non-states actors of proliferation 
concern” as those involved in “(1) efforts to develop or acquire chemical, biological, or nuclear 
weapons and associated delivery systems; or (2) transfers (either selling, receiving, or facilitating) 
of WMD, their delivery systems or related materials”).   
15
 Id. at Principle 2. 
16
 Id. at Principle 3. 
17
 Id. at Principle 4 (offering an illustrative list of six activities participating States could take in 
“support of interdiction efforts regarding cargoes of WMD, their delivery systems and related 
materials to the extent their national legal authorities permit and consistent with their obligations 
under international law and frameworks. . .”). 
18
 Id. at Preamble and Principle 4.  
19
 Welcome to Proliferation Security Initiative, at http://www.psi-online.info/Vertretung/psi/en/03-
endorsing-states/0-PSI-endorsing-states.html (last visited May 5, 2017). A good discussion of this 
wide invitation can be found in Susan J. Koch, Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Occasional Paper No. 9: Proliferation Security Initiative: Origins and Evolution 19-
20 (2012), available at 
http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/97/Documents/Publications/Occasional%20Papers/09 
_Proliferation%20Security%20Initiative.pdf. 
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undertake counter-proliferation activities, and other endorsing States.
20
  For those 
States looking to build capacity, the PSI has produced a Model National Response 
Plan.
21
   
At its core, PSI references a set of activities rather than establishing an 
institution.
22
  To date, it is credited with dozens of interdictions of WMD-related 
materials.
23
  This success comes even as (or perhaps because) the PSI is loosely 
organized.  It pushes States to develop and exercise jointly the necessary domestic 
legal tools to deal with WMD proliferation.  But it leaves States to decide for 
themselves who are “states and non-state actors of proliferation concern” and 
what constitutes “reasonable suspicion.”  This gives participating States 
considerable latitude to interpret what behavior conforms to PSI and whether to 
label an interdiction as PSI-related.
24
   
Originally, PSI was controversial because of perceptions that its 
participants were seeking to change the international legal rules relating to the 
freedom of the high seas.
25
 In practice, however, most PSI activities occur within 
a participating State’s territory or with the permission of the flag state or the 
aircraft’s State of registration.26  In other words, PSI’s primary impacts have 
occurred within domestic legal frameworks where states deploy their own 
resources (or consent to others doing so) in ways consistent with the SIP’s 
broadly stated goals.  The result is a system of cooperation that is not so much 
collective as it is coordinated.   
That said, the PSI has not ignored international law entirely.  Bilaterally, 
the United States has entered into at least 11 “ship-boarding” treaties where the 
parties give advance consent to the other sides’ search of any of its flagged 
vessels suspected of WMD trafficking, paving the way for PSI operations.
27
 PSI 
participants have also called for more widespread participation in the Protocol to 
the SUA Convention and greater implementation of various UN Security Council 
Resolutions on WMD proliferation (particularly those relating to North Korea and 
                                                          
20
 Dunne, supra note 13. The Operational Experts Group is further divided into specific regional 
groupings. Id.  
21
 Id. at 5.  
22
 Id. at 43.  
23
 Emma Belcher, The Proliferation Security Initiative: Lessons for Using Nonbinding Agreements 
(Council on Foreign Relations, 2011); see also Herr, supra note 7 (describing PSI as “moderately 
successful”).  
24
 Dunne, supra note 13, at 10.  
25
 See Dan Joyner, The Proliferation Security Initiative: Nonproliferation, Counter Proliferation, 
and International Law, 30 YALE J. INT’L L. 507 (2009).  
26
 Dunne, supra note 13, at 35 (noting despite the So San incident serving as the PSI catalyst, 
interdictions in international waters are “extremely rare”). 
27
 See, e.g., Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of the Republic of Cyprus Concerning Cooperation to Suppress the Proliferation of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction, Their Delivery Systems, and Related Materials By Sea, Signed 
July 25, 2005; entered into force January 12, 2006, at https://www.state.gov/t/isn/trty/50274.htm.  
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Iran).
28
 In that regard PSI has helped make existing international law work more 
effectively.  At the same time, participants have not sought to modify the basic 
international maritime law framework.   
In sum, the PSI offers an innovative approach to cooperation by a 
“coalition of the willing” against a global threat via loose coordination of national 
and international toolsets.  As such, it might serve as a model for addressing 
issues of global cybersecurity.
29
  We believe that there are good reasons for the 
comparison.  Specifically, there are several key aspects of the PSI that appear 
well-suited to one or more cybersecurity problems.   
II. Positive PSI Features for Global Cybersecurity 
Ultimately, the real value of PSI as a possible model for global 
cybersecurity lies not in the specific activities that it asks participating States to 
endorse, but the institutional architecture by which it does so.
30
 In other words, we 
are not arguing for a policy of more aggressive interdiction or counter-
proliferation of dangerous cyber-tools; rather, we are looking to WMD 
interdiction for lessons on cultivating international cooperation for a gamut of 
cybersecurity challenges.  For example, as States seek to build consensus around 
appropriate responses to unlawful cyber behavior (or behavior in violation of 
norms promoted by bodies like the UN GGE), a PSI architecture provides a 
potentially novel way to encourage collective action without necessitating legally 
binding commitments or changes to extant laws and norms.  
We briefly summarize below eight ways in which a PSI-like approach 
might be attractive to states for addressing some cybersecurity issues: (i) 
orientation, (ii) low entry costs; (iii) tiered structure; (iv) leveraging territorial 
jurisdiction; (v) leveraging state consent; (vi) flexibility; (vii) processes of 
evolution; and (viii) experimentation.  At the same time, we also note two 
challenges that need attention before pursuing a PSI framework for dealing with 
cyberthreats:  issues of hegemony and differing background legal frameworks.  
On balance, we conclude that the PSI architecture offers a potential model for 
coordinating international cooperation, not to halt trade in malicious cyber tools, 
but rather to coordinate state responses to unwanted cyber behavior.   
                                                          
28
 See, e.g., Protocol of 2005 to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the 
Safety of Maritime Navigation (14 Oct. 2005), IMO Doc. LEG/CONF.15/21, 1 Nov. 2005; 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (10 
March 1988) 1678 UNTS 221 (1999); UNSC Res. 1737 (2006) (re Iran); UNSC Res. 1540 (2004) 
(requiring all States to “establish domestic controls to prevent” WMD proliferation).  
29
 See Herr, supra note 7. 
30
 Thus, we should not be read to endorse an exclusively “proliferation” focused model for dealing 
with cybersecurity.  Nor do we mean to suggest that cybersecurity itself is a single problem set 
that warrants a unitary solution; it involves a diverse set of problems such that we believe one or 
more of them might benefit from a framework modeled off the PSI experiences to date.  
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 As a model for promoting international cooperation and developing 
stronger international rules for cybersecurity, PSI has many attractive or 
instructive features including  
- Orientation: PSI endorsing States share a common cause in combatting 
WMD participation and view PSI as complimentary to other existing 
responses.  A PSI-like approach to cybersecurity could adopt a similar 
framework; using the affiliation to delineate commonly held norms among a 
group of like-minded States and offering the framework as complimenting 
(rather than competing with) other existing responses.  
 
- Low Entry Costs:  As a coalition of the willing, PSI assumes cooperation can 
begin with a political commitment by just a few States. A similar commitment 
for cybersecurity would also not require onerous domestic approval processes 
associated with formal international legal institutions or instruments. And by 
framing the scope of activities to accord with extant domestic and 
international legal authorities and capacities, such a framework would takes 
States as it finds them.   At a time, when global coalitions face division and 
dissension, there may be some appeal for allowing a like-minded group of 
States to set out a coordination framework against one or more types of 
cyberthreats.  
 
- Tiered Structure: PSI accepted that some states have the resources and 
tactical skills to deal with proliferation while others did not, adopting a 
framework to accommodate this disparate capacity.  One could envision a 
similar division in cybersecurity where some States have much greater 
capacity to identify and respond to cybersecurity threats on which others may 
depend, with assurances that doing so would not violate national or 
international legal regimes.   
 
- Leveraging Territorial Jurisdiction: One of the PSI’s great strengths is 
recognizing how much extant international maritime law defers to national 
authorities and the exercise of a State’s jurisdiction within its territory, ports, 
and internal waters.  If States build up their domestic capacities to counter 
cyberthreats, the PSI experience suggests that there can be systemic benefits.  
Leaving states to act autonomously but according to a collective framework 
may leave some relatively ungoverned spaces, but if national behaviors reflect 
a sufficiently uniform and general practice it could substantially restrict the 
ability of hostile actors to operate effectively.  And while there was a time 
when many questioned the ability of territorial jurisdiction to operate vis-à-vis 
cyberspace, many States have demonstrated in recent years strong interest and 
sufficient capacity to regulate cybersecurity on territorial grounds.
31
 Thus, the 
first line of defense for responding to global cyberthreats may lie in 
coordinating better domestic authorities and responsive operations.   
                                                          
31
 See, e.g., JACK GOLDSMITH AND TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET?: ILLUSIONS OF A 
BORDERLESS WORLD (2006). 
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- Leveraging State Consent:  With few exceptions, international law defers to 
State consent to delimit lawful from unlawful behavior.
32
  Thus, where a State 
consents to another PSI participating State’s activities on its vessels or in its 
territorial seas, there are far fewer legal issues than where such consent is 
absent.  Likewise, cybersecurity might benefit from a similar push for a 
State’s consent (whether formalized in advance or on an ad hoc basis) to other 
participating State’s defensive operations in their networks or systems.  This 
would take the coordination contemplated by the Budapest Convention on 
Cybercrime
33
 and elevate it to an even more integrated response.  We might 
imagine, for example, some number of States agreeing that one State could 
conduct network investigative techniques against actors who are the source of 
cyberthreats and operating in the territory of another participating State.  
- Flexibility in defining and enforcing norms:  The PSI has allowed States to 
align around a core suite of activities while acknowledging and 
accommodating different national approaches as well as different 
interpretations of international law (or desires for its evolution to 
accommodate proliferation-related restrictions on freedom of navigation on 
the high seas).
34
  Although these ambiguities have led some to criticize PSI as 
being too malleable, this flexibility in coordinating around general norms 
rather than precise ones, may be attractive to States suspicious of being 
locked-in to specific actions (or inactions).  A PSI-approach could take 
existing norms (e.g., not targeting critical infrastructure in peacetime, not 
using CSIRTs for malicious purposes) and leave to individual participants the 
precise contours by which they understand what the norms mean.  Further 
precision could come over time as parties respond to different sorts of 
behavior (although there is a risk that the iterations might go the other way 
and lead to a norm’s failure).35  
 
- Process of Evolution:  The PSI is a “voluntary” affiliation that was able to 
take advantage of the participation of key actors and grow from less than a 
dozen States to more than one hundred today.  A similar strategy could be 
employed in developing a schedule of consequences for unwanted cyber 
behavior.  As PSI shows, there’s no need to obtain the consent of all the major 
players at once; but rather, a few key gatekeepers can start the process, even in 
the face of significant opposition (it is worth recalling that a number of States 
like India and China have publicly opposed PSI). A major design question 
from the outset is how easy or hard to make such an initiative to join, 
                                                          
32
 States cannot, however, consent to jus cogens violations such as genocide, unlawful use of force 
or torture.  
33
 Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime (Budapest, 23 Nov 2001) CETS No 185, 
available at https://www.coe.int/en/web/cybercrime/the-budapest-convention. 
34
 See Koch, supra note 19, at 13, 26-27. 
35
 Finnemore and Hollis, supra note 6, at 467 (noting that with respect to norm promotion efforts, 
“[f]ailure remains an option (and may even be the dominant outcome)”). 
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balancing wider participation with less precise or onerous expectations of 
cooperation or consent. 
 
- Experimentation: Understanding that a PSI-like cybersecurity experiment 
could evolve over time leaves room for the participating States to experiment 
with different shared activities.  In the PSI context, for example, States’ initial 
focus on international maritime interdiction gave way to more productive (and 
more easily legitimated) port state efforts to deal with the transport and trans-
shipment of WMD related materials.  A similar dynamic approach in 
cybersecurity could accommodate the reality that some efforts may fail and 
others may emerge where cooperation might be most productive. 
Challenges in Applying PSI.  In endorsing further analysis of the PSI model for 
cybersecurity, we are aware that the analogy is not perfect.  The PSI also has at 
least two problematic features that may limit its effectiveness in promoting 
cybersecurity cooperation. 
- Hegemonic and Under-represented:  PSI has been criticized for being a tool 
of U.S. hegemony with key parts of the world (e.g., the Middle East and 
Africa) under-represented (despite those very areas being at the highest risk 
for WMD proliferation). A U.S.-led effort in cybersecurity could face similar 
charges.  Indeed, there is the possibility that if the United States and a like-
minded coalition pursued a PSI-like framework for cybersecurity, a competing 
coalition might be formed by “internet sovereignty” states such as China. The 
result would be two (or more) rival coalitions looking to actively undermine 
each other.  
 
- Different background legal frameworks: Despite U.S. frustration with 
Yemen getting its Scud missiles in the So San incident, there was remarkable 
unanimity about both the underlying unlawfulness of proliferation AND what 
interdictions international law allows and those it prohibits (i.e., those of a 
vessel on the high seas without its flag State’s consent).36  That certainty gave 
the PSI room to work around the law’s limitations (e.g., by negotiating ship-
boarding agreements) or focusing on non-controversial interdictions (i.e., by a 
Port State, the flag State, or with the permission of a flag state or the State of 
an aircraft’s registration).  For cyberspace, however, how international law 
applies is currently much less clear.  Efforts like the Tallinn Manual (both the 
original and 2.0 versions) may be celebrated for highlighting the extent to 
which various international law prohibitions and requirements apply in 
cyberspace.
37
  Yet, a close reading of the text of both editions evidences 
                                                          
36
 See, e.g., Dunne, supra note 13, at 26-27 (noting how implementation of the 1968 Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, and the 1993 Chemical 
Weapons convention “provide much of the national legal basis required for undertaking the 
actions contained within the SIP” because they “ban or control the possession (with some 
exceptions) and trade in WMD, their means of delivery and dual-use goods”).   
37
 See MICHAEL SCHMITT (ED.), TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE 
TO CYBER OPERATIONS (NATO CCD COE, 2017) (Tallinn 2.0”); MICHAEL SCHMITT (ED.), 
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extensive and substantial interpretative disagreements even among its 
Independent Group of Expert authors (e.g., on defining an armed attack under 
the jus ad bellum).
38
  Moreover, outside the Tallinn process, others have 
questioned the very existence in cyberspace of some of the international law 
rules identified in the Tallinn Manual (e.g., self-defense, sovereignty, due 
diligence).
39
     
If there is little agreement on the boundaries of permissible (or 
impermissible) behavior, it necessarily complicates efforts to respond to 
conduct some group of States considers wrongful.  Other States may contest 
not only the consequences brought to bear but the idea that the original 
behavior even deserved a sanction in the first place.   
III. A Promising Model 
On balance, PSI offers a governance model that could be fruitful in 
addressing cybersecurity issues in the current environment. Like proliferation 
issues, cybersecurity cooperation could benefit from an orientation that accepts 
the reality of persistent threats and seeks to mitigate or remediate them. With the 
failure of the 2017 UN GGE, moreover, prospects for further universal, global 
efforts appear to be on hiatus.  As such, plurilateral projects are a more viable 
alternative for cooperation.  Like-minded states could, for example, coalesce 
cooperation around the enforcement of specific, agreed norms of behavior such as 
those articulated by the UN GGE in 2015 (e.g., protecting critical infrastructure 
from malicious cyber threats; assisting others whose critical infrastructure is 
threatened; sharing information; responsibly reporting vulnerabilities, assisting 
the victims of the most severe cyberthreats).
40
   State capacity to conform to these 
norms is, of course, highly varied.  But, that is precisely where a PSI-like tiered 
structure could prove useful as those with capacity take action, including with the 
consent of other participating states where necessary.  Focusing operations within 
participating state territories and employing consent to such operations could, 
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moreover, go a long way to ensuring the project, like PSI, works within the 
bounds of existing national and international legal authorities.  
 Ultimately, a PSI-model for cybersecurity recognizes that the current 
dynamic environment requires flexibility with the idea that the most effective 
measures can evolve, over time, into best practices for global cybersecurity 
cooperation.  For now, it is enough to suggest that a like-minded, voluntary group 
of States acting autonomously but cooperatively could improve on the status quo.  
In the critical infrastructure context, for example, a PSI-model could avoid the 
problem of defining what constitutes “critical infrastructure,” focusing instead on 
identifying a set of common practices (e.g., information sharing, capacity 
building, mutual legal assistance, domestic law enforcement actions, etc.) 
designed to protect whatever infrastructure each State views as critical.  
Our point is not, however, to argue for (or against) particular cooperative 
mechanisms.  Our aim is more modest – to emphasize how the architecture in 
which any cybersecurity cooperation efforts rest matters.  And to the extent there 
are obvious roadblocks, it makes sense for any PSI-model to accommodate these 
rather than run into them.  For example, to avoid charges of hegemony, 
cybersecurity cooperation should take advantage of distributed capacities to 
ensure that those with the capacity provide technical assistance and other capacity 
building measures (e.g., information sharing, technical training) to encourage 
participation by less capable States.  Such exchanges would not, however, be 
necessarily one-sided.  States with less capacity can still add their voice to 
operations by the more skilled sub-set of participating States, whether to endorse 
efforts to halt or take-down sources of malicious cyber-activity elsewhere or to 
consent to doing so in their own territories.  The broader the coalition standing 
behind the actions of capable states, the greater the potential impact on other 
States on the fence about whether to engage in malicious behavior.   
Similarly, differences over how international laws applies to cyberspace 
counsel against building a PSI-model for cybersecurity that focuses on enforcing 
such laws (at least until such time as States agree more precisely on what the law 
is or what it means).  Instead, cooperation could focus on improving cybersecurity 
by coordinating around national legal authorities within participating state 
territories.  Certainly, such an approach would not do much to deal with safe 
havens in non-participating states, just as PSI leaves open possibilities of 
proliferation in non-participating territories.  Yet, by seeking to silo off particular 
areas and coordinate acceptable bounds of behavior within those areas, 
cybersecurity conditions may improve even with the continued risk of threats 
from outside participating State territories.    
The time is ripe for new approaches to cybersecurity cooperation.  We 
believe the PSI deserves further consideration as a candidate for the architecture 
of such activities. And we say “a” candidate deliberately.  We should not be read 
to suggest that a PSI-like approach is the only—or even the best—solution going 
forward.  The economic, privacy, and national security implications of the 
manifold suite of cyberthreats counsel for a multi-pronged response. Still, we 
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believe that the PSI should be considered as one of several processes that can help 
restore trust in the ICT environment and ensure a future where cyberspace is more 
open, stable, and secure.   
